A Structured Approach to Securing the Connected Car by Kleberger, Pierre
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF LICENTIATE OF ENGINEERING
A Structured Approach to Securing the Connected Car
PIERRE KLEBERGER
Division of Networks and Systems
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Göteborg, Sweden 2012
A Structured Approach to Securing the Connected Car
PIERRE KLEBERGER
c© PIERRE KLEBERGER, 2012
Technical report no 99L
ISSN 1652-876X
Division of Networks and Systems
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
Chalmers University of Technology
SE-412 96 Göteborg
Sweden
Telephone: +46 (0)31-772 1000
Chalmers Reproservice
Göteborg, Sweden 2012
A Structured Approach to Securing the Connected Car
PIERRE KLEBERGER
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Chalmers University of Technology
Thesis for the degree of Licentiate of Engineering,
an intermediate degree between M.Sc. and Ph.D.
Abstract
Vehicles of today have become increasingly dependent on software to handle their func-
tionalities. Updating and maintaining the software in vehicles has therefore become a
costly process for the automotive industry. By introducing wireless communications to
vehicles, vehicular maintenance can greatly be improved and many other new applications
can also be brought to the vehicles. However, the vehicle was not designed with security
in mind. Since the vehicle is safety-critical, it is vital that such new remote services do
not violate the safety and security requirements of the vehicle. Thus, this thesis presents
a general approach to securing the connected car and the usefulness of the approach is
demonstrated in a vehicular diagnostics scenario.
The thesis comes in two main parts. In the first part, we address security mechanisms
for the connected car. First, a survey of current mechanisms to secure the in-vehicle
networks is made. Then, a description of possible communication methods with vehicles
is given and a taxonomy of current entities involved in such communication is presented.
The taxonomy is organised in actors, vehicle-to-X communications, network paths, and
dependability and security attributes. The usefulness of the taxonomy is demonstrated
by two examples.
In the second part, we address security with respect to vehicular diagnostics. First,
an overall security analysis of the interaction between the connected car and the repair
shop is conducted. We find that the most imminent risk in the repair shop is the loss of
authentication keys. The loss of such keys allows masquerading attacks against vehicles.
To address this problem, we propose a Kerberos-inspired protocol for authentication and
authorisation of the diagnostics equipment and a trusted third party is introduced.
To conclude, this thesis shows the value of adopting a structured approach to securing
the connected car. The approach has been shown to be useful for identifying threats and
countermeasures and thus help improving security.
Keywords: connected car; vehicular services; security mechanisms; remote diagnostics.
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Introductory Summary

1
Introduction
More and more functionality in today’s vehicles are implemented in software. A modern
car has somewhere between 50–100 embedded computers, i.e., electronic control units
(ECUs). The ECUs handle different tasks, such as engine control, anti-spin system,
and mirror adjustment. As vehicles have become so dependent on software, procedures
to maintain and update the vehicles’ software efficiently are crucial. The current way
to update software is to bring the vehicle to the repair shop and physically connect a
diagnostics equipment to the in-vehicle network. This is a costly process for the automotive
company if cars need to be recalled due to bugs in their software. With the introduction
of wireless vehicular communications, there is room for improvements (see [1, 2]).
Until recently, vehicles have been closed systems, but this is changing. As a consequence,
the closed in-vehicle networks are now becoming exposed to external traffic, traffic that is
potentially dangerous with respect to the vehicle’s safety requirements. Since vehicles
were not exposed to these threats before, they do not have any security features. The lack
of security has already been shown by researches [3, 4]. Therefore, to be able to fruitfully
benefit from wireless vehicular communications, the vehicle has to be secured. In this
thesis, we adopt a structured approach to this task, i.e., to secure the connected car.
This introductory summary is organised as follows. After this section, the objective
of the thesis is given in Section 1.1. Then, the connected car concept is presented
in Section 1.2. The appended papers are summarised in Section 1.3 followed by the
contributions of the thesis in Section 1.4. Related work is presented in Section 1.5. Finally,
a conclusion is given in Section 1.6.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Thesis Objective
The research presented in this thesis aims to provide approaches to securing the connected
car, and in particular the connected car’s interaction with the repair shop. This goal is
reached in several steps: First, a survey of existing research and security mechanisms is
made. Second, an infrastructure for the connected car and its environment is presented
and a taxonomy of relevant entities in the infrastructure is suggested. Third, a security
analysis of the interaction between the connected car and the repair shop is made, thus
providing an example of the use of the taxonomy. The security analysis points out a
number of critical security problems. Finally, security solutions to the detected problems
are suggested.
The following research questions are addressed:
1. Could a systematisation and categorisation of entities related to the connected car
and its in-vehicle network help detecting security problems and finding security
solutions?
2. Which security problems could be derived by means of a structured security analysis
of diagnostic services and repair shop interaction? Which corresponding counter-
measures could be found?
3. How could the problem of lost authentication keys in connection with repair shop
interaction be solved?
The thesis is divided into two main parts. Part I is a survey and taxonomy of the
connected car infrastructure. It forms a scientific basis and provides a tool for the applied
security analysis work to follow. Part II presents a security analysis of the connected
repair shop using the tool proposed in Part I. Further, it suggests countermeasures for
the detected security problems.
1.2 The Connected Car
1.2.1 Overview
The connected car can be described as a vehicle with one or more external wireless
communication possibilities, which connects the vehicle to an external network. The
requirement of external wireless communication distinguishes the connected car from
other vehicles where internal connections already exists, e.g., the On-Board Diagnostics II
(OBD-II) interface used for wired vehicle diagnostics or the USB ports that are becoming
more and more common. The external link is used to supply the vehicle with different
services, both administrative services such as remote diagnostics and software download,
as well as other non-administrative services like eTolling and media streaming.
A simplified model of the connected car consists of three domains [5]:
(1) the vehicle, consisting of the in-vehicle network and ECUs,
(2) the portal at the automotive company, delivering services to the vehicle, and
4
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Figure 1.1: Model of the connected car infrastructure
(3) the communication link between the vehicle and the portal.
The model shows the concept of the connected car by the vehicle utilising an external
communication link to the portal, which can supply the vehicle with services from the
automotive company.
Another model that clarifies the details of the connected car and its infrastructure is
shown in Figure 1.1. This model consists of two domains, the managed infrastructure
and the vehicle communication. Details of the vehicle, the managed infrastructure, and
the vehicle communication are described in the following paragraphs.
The Vehicle
The vehicle consists of embedded computers, called electronic control units (ECUs),
which are connected to each other in an in-vehicle network. ECUs are further connected
to sensors and actuators, so that they can receive information from sensors and send
commands to actuators, to perform their tasks, e.g., send command to lift the windows
as the driver presses the “lift window” button, or activate the airbag as the vehicle senses
a collision.
The in-vehicle network is divided into sub-networks of different bus system technologies.
Available technologies are: Controller Area Network (CAN), Local Interconnect Network
(LIN), Media Oriented Systems Transport (MOST), and FlexRay. The choice of bus
technology used in different sub-networks depends on the communication requirements of
5
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the tasks that are run in the connected ECUs. The sub-networks are connected to each
other through special gateway ECUs.
An OBD-II interface enables a diagnostics equipment to be physically connected to
the in-vehicle network. This port is used to perform diagnostics of the vehicle, i.e., to
communicate with ECUs by sending and receiving commands and status information and
to update the firmware in the ECUs. Such communication is expected to be performed
over a wireless link in future connected cars.
Managed Infrastructure
The managed infrastructure is divided into five parts. These parts are: automotive
company applications’ centre, third party applications’ centre, trusted network, untrusted
network, and Internet backbone.
The automotive company applications’ centre consists of a set of servers, which provides
services to the automotive companies’ vehicles. It holds necessary information about the
vehicle, such as information from previous services (e.g., diagnostics data), configuration
data, cryptographic keys, as well as new software available for the ECUs. All other services
delivered to the vehicle, but not provided by the automotive company, are provided by
the third party applications’ centre. It is not unrealistic to imagine that large ”application
stores” will be implemented here by third parties.
Some networks can be considered to be trusted by the applications’ centres and the
vehicle. For example, a repair shop may be considered to be a trusted network by the
automotive company and the vehicle. In delivering a service to this network, it may well
be that some requirements in an implementation can be relaxed. Furthermore, other
local services can be available in these networks for running the local infrastructure and
providing service to the vehicle. Networks not considered to be trusted are regarded as
untrusted. In the same way as for the trusted networks, other local services may also be
provided in these networks.
The Internet backbone, with its Internet Service Providers (ISPs), is the core network
for connecting the other four regions together. A backbone network is usually well
protected and operated by network specialists in a Network Operation Centre (NOC). It
is therefore reasonable to assume that intentional modification of data in these networks
is very unlikely.
Vehicle Communication
To enable vehicle communication, a wireless gateway, also known as the Communication
Unit (CU) [6], is introduced in the in-vehicle network. The gateway enables Vehicle-to-
Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) communication, collectively known as
Vehicle-to-X (V2X) communication.
A few different technologies exists for V2I communication. First, roads will be equipped
with road-side unit (RSU) by means of which vehicles will establish communication to
the infrastructure using the WAVE-protocol [7]. These RSUs provide services to the
vehicles, including general Internet access. The second possibility is to use ordinary
WiFi-technology where wireless access points (APs) are used, e.g., open APs in cities, or
6
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car owners’ own APs at their parking lots, outside their homes. Finally, communication
can be performed using cellular networks, such as 3G and HSDPA.
It should also be noted that other communication means with the vehicle exists.
For example, global positioning system (GPS) signals are received for positioning and
navigation, and radio data system (RDS) signals are received for traffic information.
1.2.2 Challenges
There are some general requirements that present special challenges for securing the
connected car and its in-vehicle network:
(1) resource constrains of the ECU. The ECU has limited processing power and memory,
which limits the possible security features that can be implemented on an ECU.
Public-key cryptography is one example of a processing-intensive algorithm which
currently takes long time to execute and therefore is not usable in, for example,
verification of in-vehicle messages. Another example is firmware that is larger than
the available internal memory in the ECU and therefore creates implications for
software download protocols and the ECU reprogramming process.
(2) limited possibilities of extra cost for the connected devices. The automotive industry is
very cost sensitive and any new security solution must therefore be very cost efficient.
Even very small increases in cost of ECUs affect the revenue of the automotive
company. For example, if the cost of an ECU is increased by just e 1 and the vehicle
has 10 ECUs of that kind, the total increase of cost for one vehicle will be e 10. Even
though e 10 does not seem much, an automotive company selling 1 million vehicles a
year will reduce its revenue by e 10 million.
(3) lifetime of the solution. A vehicle of today may be used for as long as 10–15 years. This
is quite an extensive period of time compared to ordinary desktop computers. One
should note that this is only the time of usage and does not include the development
time and that the developed architecture is used in production for several years. The
overall lifecycle of a solution can therefore be as long as 20–25 years. How security
features should be handled in the vehicle for such long timespans is yet an unsolved
problem.
1.2.3 Vehicular Services
Many services can be expected to be introduced to the connected car. These services can
be divided into administrative services and non-administrative services.
Administrative Services
Administrative services are those services that are used to maintain the connected car,
i.e., to diagnose the vehicle and update its software. The services remote diagnostics
[1] and software download [2] are generally referred to as two services, but depending
on the remote diagnostics protocol used, software download is incorporated within the
diagnostics protocol as, e.g., in the programmingSession in ISO 14229 [8].
7
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There are many expected benefits of introducing wireless remote diagnostics [2]. In the
case of a repair shop, no cables are needed, something that shortens the time for connecting
the vehicle to the repair shop, and also makes it possible to connect many vehicles at
the same time. However, using wireless connections, where many vehicles can connect
to the same wireless AP, also raises security related questions. How does the mechanic
know that she is working with the right vehicle, and what support is implemented in the
network to protect the vehicle against malicious network behaviour?
In an effort to create a common diagnostics protocol for vehicles connected over
IP-based networks, ISO has introduced the protocol Diagnostics over IP (DoIP) [9]. This
protocol enables the transmission of other diagnostics protocols as application data, such
as ISO 14229 [8]. Unfortunately, there are no security mechanisms in this protocol.
To conclude, since maintenance of the vehicle includes diagnostics and updates of the
vehicle’s ECUs, appropriate security mechanisms are needed for the entire vehicle.
Non-Administrative Services
Numerous non-administrative services using V2X communication have been discussed
during the last decade [10, 11]. For example, platooning (trains of vehicles), pre-crash
warning, virtual traffic lights, media streaming, etc. Even though these services may
control the vehicle to some degree (e.g., adapting the vehicle’s speed in platooning) they
do not permanently change any software or issue any diagnostics commands. Nevertheless,
these services need to be developed in such a way that they do not affect the safety of the
vehicle and the communication needs to be appropriately secured.
1.3 A Structured Approach to Securing the Connected
Car
This section gives a summary of the appended papers.
1.3.1 Part I: A Survey and Taxonomy of the Connected Car In-
frastructure
Paper A: Security Aspects of the In-Vehicle Network in the Connected Car
In Paper A, a survey of the research within securing the in-vehicle network of the
connected car was performed. We found that most of the work published so far was
towards identifying and demonstrating problems with security in the in-vehicle network
and only to a lesser extent towards presenting solutions. Also, even though there are
four bus technologies used within the in-vehicle network (CAN, FlexRay, MOST, and
LIN), almost all of the research has been focused on the CAN-bus. Thus, much research
remains to be done.
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Paper B: A Framework for Assessing the Security of the Connected Car
Infrastructure
Vehicular services, which were developed for usage in closed networks, were not designed
with security in mind and when a wireless connection is introduced, these services need to
be adapted to the new hostile environment provided by the wireless connection. However,
to secure services for the connected car, a model of the infrastructure to analyse possible
communication means and security threats is needed. In Paper B, we present a framework
for assessing the security of the connected car infrastructure. The framework consists of
two parts, the model of the infrastructure and a security assessment tree. The model
helps us to map possible communication means between the vehicle and various services
in the infrastructure. The assessment tree assesses different security aspects of the service
delivery.
1.3.2 Part II: Securing Vehicular Diagnostics for Connected Cars
Paper C: An In-Depth Analysis of the Security of the Connected Repair Shop
Using wireless networks for vehicle diagnostics in repair shops comes with many benefits,
e.g, no cables are needed and many vehicles can be diagnosed at the same time. However,
it also raises some security related questions, such as, how are vehicles protected towards
attacks from other connected vehicles. In this paper, we use a reduced version of the
European Telecommunications Standards Institute’s (ETSI) Threat, Vulnerability, and
Risk Analysis (TVRA) method to analyse the security in future connected repair shops.
Threats, vulnerabilities, and general countermeasures were derived for this environment.
We found that, for this environment, implementing security at link layer is beneficial,
even though it is not supported in common protocols of today. We also found that,
even though the repair shop can be secured, vehicles outside of the repair shop are still
vulnerable. The authentication keys used in diagnostics equipment need to be handled
carefully. If these keys are lost or stolen, they will give access to any vehicle that accepts
these authentication keys, even outside of the repair shop.
Paper D: Protecting Vehicles Against Unauthorised Remote Diagnostics
As discovered in Paper C, the loss of authentication keys to diagnostics equipment can
have major security implications on vehicles. If an attacker manages to get hold of a
pair of authentication keys, the attacker may get access to all vehicles that accept these
keys, even outside of the repair shop. In this paper, we address this security problem
and propose an authorisation protocol. In this, a trusted third party (TTP) is used to
issue authorisation tickets, so that access control can be enforced in the vehicle. The
TTP holds the security policies for vehicles describing the time of access and type of
diagnostics messages allowed to be processed by the vehicle. The authorisation protocol
is independent of the diagnostics protocol used.
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1.4 Thesis Contributions
The main contributions of this thesis are:
• We have surveyed current research on in-vehicle network and identified open issues
to secure the in-vehicle network. Thus, research question 1 is addressed.
• We have developed a general model of the connected car infrastructure and a
taxonomy to facilitate the derivation of security mechanisms for the connected car’s
services. The taxonomy addresses research question 1 and is a prerequisite for
research question 2.
• We have made a security analysis of the interaction between the connected car and
the repair shop. Thus, we have shown that our structured approach to assess the
security is valuable. The approach helped us identify threats and countermeasures,
as well as critical security issues that might not have been found otherwise. The
security analysis addresses research question 2.
• We have proposed a protocol to address the most severe security problem of remote
vehicular diagnostics, that of loss of authentication keys. Thus, research question 3
is addressed.
1.5 Related Work
The research within the area of the connected car is just in its beginning and the field of
securing the connected car roots from about a decade ago [12]. Since then, lots of effort
has been spent, especially during the last years. As the research area is young, only a few
extensive surveys exists so far [13–15].
Brooks et al. [16] show with use-cases what needs to be protected in a vehicle and
different scenarios of what operations may be conducted on the vehicle. The possible
communication means to the vehicle were also classified. They further use an adapted
version of the CERT Taxonomy to analyse attacks towards services already implemented
in the vehicle or that will come in the near future. Among the services analysed were the
need for secure update of firmware in ECUs and attack risks when the vehicle becomes
more and more integrated into the systems of the automotive company. One example of
such a system is remote diagnostics.
Jenkins and Mahmud [17] discuss security problems and attacks towards the vehicle.
They look at inter-vehicle and in-vehicle communications, and also at software and
hardware attacks. A further introduction to security for embedded systems is given by
Kocher et al. [18].
1.5.1 Vehicle-to-X Communication
The research within Vehicle-to-X (V2X), i.e., Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and Vehicle-
to-Vehicle (V2V), are mainly performed in large collaboration projects or consortia.
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Research in a security architecture for vehicular communication (VC) systems have
been performed within the SeVeCOM project [19]. In [20], Papadimitratos et al. present
necessary security requirements to provide the services of secure beaconing, secure neigh-
bour discovering, and secure geocasting in VC systems. Certificates are used for securing
the communication between vehicles and pseudonyms for addressing the introduced
privacy problem of using certificates; the certificate gives the vehicle a unique identity,
which makes it possible to trace the vehicle and its driver. In [21], Kargl et al. present
implementation details of the security architecture. Furthermore, the integration of mobile
devices and different communication technologies into the VC system are briefly discussed.
1.5.2 In-Vehicle Network
Most of the work in addressing security of the in-vehicle network has been towards
identifying and showing on the lack of security and less towards defining security measures.
A few extensive investigations regarding the security of the vehicle has recently been
conducted [3, 4, 22, 23].
Wolf et al. [22] discuss the security within the vehicle. Possible attacks, protection
mechanisms, and some security-critical applications are presented. Koscher et al. [3]
have recently highlighted that there is a significant lack of necessary security mechanisms
in in-vehicle networks. They conducted experiments on two vehicles. Using techniques
such as packet sniffing, packet fuzzing, and reverse-engineering, they found a number of
attacks that could be performed towards the in-vehicle network. For example, among
the attacks performed were the possibility to disable the brake while driving. Even
though these attacks require physical access to the vehicle, it is not unrealistic to assume
that such attacks also would be possible via a wireless connection to the vehicle. In [4],
Checkoway et al. continues the work by analysing the attack surface of a vehicle and
demonstrated a set of attacks towards the vehicle. Among possible attacks were, for
example, compromising the PassThru-device used for connecting the in-vehicle network
to the WiFi-network. When the PassThru-device was compromised, malicious software
was installed in the device, which attacked the connected vehicle. Another example is the
possibility to send malicious messages onto the CAN-bus by playing a specially crafted
CD, thereby launching a buffer overflow in the decoder of the CD player. In addition to
these attacks are the security and privacy issues demonstrated by Rouf et al. [23], where
they performed an attack against the tire-pressure sensors in the vehicle. These sensors
are mandatory in new vehicles so that drivers can be warned in case of flat tires.
Simulations have extensively been used for analysing the security in the in-vehicle
network [24–26]. In [24], Hoppe and Dittmann investigate the possibility of performing
sniffing and replay attacks on the CAN-bus using simulations of an electronic window
lift system. Attacks were also performed against the electronic window system using real
hardware as well as attacks against the warning lights of the anti-theft system and the
air-bag control system [27]. Nilsson and Larson [25] introduce the concept of a vehicle
virus. The virus was listening for a message on the CAN-bus that locks the doors remotely,
and when that message was captured, the virus executed malicious actions. A security
evaluation has also been performed on the FlexRay-protocol [26]. However, analysis of
the MOST-bus has not, to our knowledge, been conducted yet.
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To classify attacks against the vehicle, both the CERT Taxonomy by Howard and
Longstaff [28] and the taxonomy by Hamle and Bauer [29] have been used or adapted
[16, 25, 27, 30, 31]. A defence-in-depth approach based on [29] for securing the vehicle
is discussed by Larson and Nilsson [30]. The five layers they look at are: prevention,
detection, deflection, countermeasures, and recovery. In [31], Nilsson and Larson present
their approaches for the different layers. In general, not so many proposals have been
suggested regarding protection (hence prevention) of the communication in the in-vehicle
network [12, 32–38]. Furthermore, a few approaches to introducing Intrusion Detection
System (IDS) into the vehicle have been suggested. Both specification-based [39] and
anomaly-based approaches [40–43] have been investigated. An attempt to deflect attacks
using honeypots has been described in [44].
Lang et al. [45] provide an interesting discussion of the security implications when
the vehicle is connected using an IP-based network. Nine ”hypothetical attack scenarios”
were suggested based on attacks known from ”ordinary IT systems”, i.e. attacks on the
communication protocols, malicious code, and social engineering. Each scenario was
analysed with respect to confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity, and non-
repudiation. Also, an attempt to quantitatively estimate the impact on safety was made.
Thus, for each of the scenarios a safety-integrity level (SIL) value was proposed.
Finally, a hardware security module (HSM) has been developed by the EVITA Project
[46]. The HSM comes with three security levels: high, medium, and low. Depending on
the requirement of the different vehicle ECUs, one of these HSMs should be integrated
into each ECU. The HSM enables hardware-accelerated cryptographic operations, so that
in-vehicle network traffic can be protected by use of encryption.
1.5.3 Remote Diagnostics and Software Download
Most of the work within securing remote diagnostics and software download has been
directed towards the software download process and very little towards remote diagnostics.
Both unicast and multicast approaches have been proposed for secure remote software
download. In [47], Mahmud et al. describe a protocol by means of which software
download is performed using an Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) infrastructure.
The automotive company issues symmetric keys to encrypt the software transmitted
between the software supplier and the vehicle. To increase the security in the transmission,
they propose that the software should be sent twice and possibly also in random order to
avoid attackers from predicting the message order. To authenticate the vehicle, a set of
authentication keys are installed in the vehicle and also stored in a central server and
transmitted to the appropriate AP within the ITS during authentication. The protocol
was analysed in [48].
In the multicast approach proposed by Hossain and Mahmud [49], a special device
denoted Network Device Monitor (NDM) is installed in the AP within an ITS infrastructure.
The purpose of the NDM is to authenticate vehicles, manage the session keys for the
multicast group, and to send software to the vehicles therein. A set of authentication keys
are installed in the vehicle and also stored in a central server. These keys are transmitted
and used by the NDM to authenticate the vehicle. Furthermore, digital certificates were
used as authentication keys for authentication between the automotive company, the
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software supplier, and the NDM.
In [50], Nilsson and Larson propose a firmware update process where the firmware
is split into smaller fragments and transmitted to the vehicle. Each fragment is hashed
and the hash is concatenated to the previous fragment. Thus, all fragments needs to
be hashed before any of them can be transmitted. The hash of the first fragment is
used as an initial fragment containing a digital signature over the first hash, thereby
ensuring that all following hashes cannot be modified without detection. Encryption is
also applied to the transmission. This protocol ensures data integrity, data authentication,
data confidentiality, and data freshness.
Idrees et al. [51] give a detailed presentation of a remote software download procedure
including some remote diagnostics, which utilises the HSM designed within the EVITA
project.
Efforts are also made by ISO to create a standardized diagnostics protocol, DoIP [9],
and some initial tests have been performed by Johanson et al. [52]. However, appropriate
security mechanisms are still missing in the DoIP-protocol.
Finally, as the firmware has reached the ECU, reprogramming of the ECU needs to be
performed securely. Methods for ensuring that the firmware is flashed correctly have also
been proposed in [53–55].
To conclude, we find that very little has been done regarding secure remote diagnostics.
Instead, a majority of the proposals addresses software download as a single service. Since
there are great benefits of a remote diagnostics service, an architecture for secure remote
diagnostics, including software download, should be defined.
1.6 Conclusion
In this thesis, we have presented work to adopt a structured approach to securing the
connected car. We have described a model of the connected car infrastructure and
presented a taxonomy of its entities to facilitate the derivation of security mechanisms.
We have also conducted a security analysis of the interaction between the connected car
and the repair shop that exhibits the usefulness of our proposed model of the connected
car infrastructure.
Many new services are expected to be introduced in the vehicle and since the vehicle
is safety-critical, it is vital that the vehicle is secured, so that these new services cannot
violate with the safety and security mechanisms of the vehicle. One such new service
that was analysed is remote diagnostics. Here some problems were detected and remedies
were proposed. However, the model of the connected car infrastructure is general and the
model as well as the taxonomy are believed to be applicable in many similar situations.
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